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Abstract: 
This article describes changes in divorce laws in the United States, England and Wales, France, 
and Sweden in the areas of obtaining a divorce, spousal support, child support and child custody. 
Also, the article discusses the relation between individuals' values and their evaluations of the 
effects of changes in divorce laws on family members, as well as the relation between legal 
change and cultural values. In addition to providing valuable descriptive information about 
divorce laws from an international perspective, comparative analyses provide unique insights 
into the relation between culture and laws pertaining to divorce beyond that provided by an 
analysis of any single country. This analysis not only provides information about the laws of 
several Western countries, but also highlights the complex relation between cultural values and 
the legal aspects of divorce. To further the understanding of this complex relation, the authors' 
recommend that future researchers must incorporate non-Western countries into their analyses. 
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 Article: 
In this article, we describe recent changes in divorce laws in the United States, England and 
Wales, France, and Sweden in the areas of obtaining a divorce, spousal support, child support, 
and child custody. Although there are important differences among countries, there are some 
common trends. Divorce has become increasingly easy to obtain; spousal support has become 
less common; efforts have been made to increase child support awards and to improve payment 
compliance; and shared parental decision-making authority has become increasingly accepted 
and encouraged. We discuss the relation between individuals' values and their evaluations of the 
effects of changes in divorce laws on family members, as well as the relation between legal 
change and cultural values. 
There has been a well-documented increase in the divorce rate in Western countries in the last 30 
years, although the rate has been relatively stable in the last decade (Phillips, 1988). Paralleling 
the increase in the divorce rate have been profound changes in the laws that govern divorce and 
its aftermath. In this article, in keeping with the spirit of the 1994 International Year of the 
Family, we examine laws related to divorce in several Western countries, including the United 
States, France, England and Wales, and Sweden. We also propose that it is difficult to determine 
the consequences of these legal changes on family life because evaluations of these effects by 
individuals (including researchers and those who review their work) depend on their positions on 
several value dimensions. 
In addition to providing valuable descriptive information about divorce laws from an 
international perspective, comparative analyses provide unique insights into the relation between 
culture and laws pertaining to divorce beyond that provided by an analysis of any single country. 
Because countries have different cultural traditions and somewhat different laws pertaining to 
divorce, comparative analyses provide an opportunity to explore how cultural values, and 
changes in values over time, relate to laws regarding divorce. Thus, we conclude this article with 
some comments about the complex relation between cultural values and legal change. 
Our focus is on Western countries because there is more available information on divorce laws in 
these countries than in non-Western countries. Because divorce for couples with children, 
relative to those couples without children, is more complex and has led to greater controversy 
among family policy specialists, we focus our review on divorce laws as they pertain to couples 
with children. 
Before proceeding to the survey of divorce laws, it is important to draw a distinction between 
marital breakdown and divorce. Marital breakdown occurs when a couple's marriage has 
deteriorated to the point that it is no longer viable and does not meet the mutual needs of the 
spouses. Divorce, by contrast, is the formal termination of the marriage in a court of law. 
Therefore, marital breakdown is a private experience, whereas divorce is a public one. This 
distinction is a critical one, because marital breakdown does not necessarily result in divorce 
(Phillips, 1988). Although marital breakdown occurs in all societies, the manner in which 
couples choose to formally resolve this breakdown differs both within and across countries. 
TRENDS IN LAWS PERTAINING TO DIVORCE IN WESTERN COUNTRIES 
There are two primary aspects of law relevant to divorce. First, there are laws that regulate how 
couples obtain a divorce. Second, there are laws that govern the aftermath of divorce, including 
such matters as spousal support, child support, and child custody. In this section, we review each 
of these two aspects with respect to the countries of interest. 
Laws Pertaining to Obtaining a Divorce 
The modem history of divorce law in the United States and Western Europe arguably began in 
the 1960s, when almost all of those countries that recognized divorce enacted substantially 
modified procedures and grounds. Prior to 1960, the United States, England and Wales, and 
France had divorce laws built around the idea that one spouse was at fault for the marital rift 
(Glendon, 1989; Phillips, 1988). Of the countries surveyed here, only Sweden had a law before 
1960 that allowed divorce without an assertion of fault (Rheinstein, 1971). 
The United States. At the outset, it should be noted that family law in general and divorce law in 
particular are determined at the state level in the United States, primarily because of its federalist 
roots, which emphasize decentralized states' rights (Resnik, 1991). However, because of 
"migratory divorce" (i.e., couples traveling to states with less restrictive divorce laws than their 
own), it is difficult for any one state to have a law that makes divorce more difficult to obtain 
than in other states. By contrast, divorce law is governed nationally in virtually all countries of 
Western Europe and Scandinavia. 
The decentralization of divorce law in the United States makes widespread public debate 
regarding divorce laws less feasible than in other countries. England and France have had 
national debates on the provisions of divorce laws, whereas divorce-related issues seldom 
generate much attention in individual U.S. states (Glendon, 1987; Jacob, 1988). Thus, compared 
to other countries, the formulation of policy in the United States has not been as dependent upon 
societal debate and compromise. 
Divorce in most American states was based almost exclusively on fault grounds until the 1960s. 
Fault grounds are those that assess blame against one of the spouses, and typically consisted of 
adultery, desertion, physical and mental cruelty, long imprisonment for a felony, and 
drunkenness (Scott, 1990). 
After World War II, fault-based divorce laws became increasingly anachronistic, leading to large 
numbers of migratory divorces and collusion (i.e., couples inventing nonexistent fault grounds) 
(Jacob, 1988; Scott, 1990). Thus, there was a sharp contrast between the fault-based laws 
governing divorce and the relatively easy access to divorce that existed in practice (Glendon, 
1989). In addition, many involved in the process of divorce (e.g., spouses, judges, mental health 
professionals) had become increasingly distraught at the adversarial and bitter nature of divorce 
proceedings (Weitzman, 1985). 
Reform of the divorce laws in the United States began in the state of New York, which had a 
restrictive divorce law that required one spouse to demonstrate that the other had engaged in 
adultery (Jacob, 1988). The major impetus for reform was that couples often fabricated stories of 
adultery to meet the letter of the law and judges were often willing to give lenient interpretations 
of the evidence to support the divorce petitions. The revised law was still based on fault grounds, 
but added a number of grounds for divorce other than adultery, including cruel and inhuman 
treatment, abandonment for 2 or more years, confinement in a prison for 3 or more years, and an 
agreed-upon separation of at least 2 years (Divorce Reform Law, 1966). Within a decade of 
passing, there were several changes in the law that made divorce even easier to obtain: The 
waiting period for obtaining a divorce after a separation was reduced from 2 years to 1, and a 
mandatory counseling provision (designed to facilitate reconciliations) was eliminated (Jacob, 
1988). 
The reform movement continued in California (Weitzman, 1985). The Family Law Act of 1969 
provided for divorce for the "irremediable breakdown" of the marriage if there were 
"irreconcilable differences" between the spouses (California Civil Code, 1983). Thus, California 
was the first state in the United States to enact a "no-fault" divorce law. The framers of the 
legislation were careful to assert that they did not intend to make divorce easy to obtain; their 
intent was to permit divorce only after there was considerable evidence that the marriage could 
not be salvaged and after the spouses were provided with counseling that might lead to 
reconciliation (Jacob, 1988). 
Legislative reform quickly spread. By 1985, no state remained that allowed only fault-based 
divorce (Glendon, 1989). As of this writing, fault grounds for divorce have been abolished in 20 
states and the remaining states have some form of mixed grounds compromise: fault grounds 
combined with breakdown, separation, incompatibility, or mutual consent. The vast majority of 
states allow mutual or unilateral no-fault divorce with virtually no waiting period (Walker & 
Elrod, 1993). Only in a few states is the waiting period for divorce when only one spouse applies 
more than 1 year (Walker & Elrod, 1993). Even with procedural delays and waiting periods (if 
they exist), spouses can divorce much more quickly now than in the previous, fault-based 
system. In addition, no state has a "hardship clause," which allows the court the option of 
denying a divorce petition if granting the divorce would result in hardship for one of the spouses. 
England and Wales. England and Wales are properly considered as one entity, because both 
adhere to British law (Stone, 1990). Therefore, references to English law also refer to Welsh law. 
Until 1857, divorce in England was available almost exclusively by act of Parliament or by the 
Church of England in the ecclesiastical courts (Cretney & Masson, 1990; Stetson, 1982). The 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1857 created a Court for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes and gave the 
court jurisdiction to consider and grant divorces. While the procedure changed, the substantive 
ground for divorce remained essentially the same: adultery (Cretney & Masson, 1990). 
Interestingly, a wife could not rely solely on adultery to seek a divorce; she had to allege some 
other marital offense as well (Stone, 1990). Despite the change in the locus of decision making 
from Parliament to the courts, divorce was still very difficult to obtain for those who were not 
wealthy. 
Adultery remained the only legally recognized basis for divorce until the Matrimonial Causes 
Act 1937 added as additional fault grounds the following: cruelty, desertion for a continuous 
period of 3 years or more, and "incurable insanity." Within a short time after enactment of the 
1937 Act, it became clear that the fault-based system was unrealistic; an increasing number of 
divorcing couples were simply colluding and inventing grounds for divorce to fit the statute 
(Cretney & Masson, 1990; Stone, 1990). By 1951, a Royal Commission was assembled to 
consider a reform (Cretney & Masson, 1990). Members could not agree on what course to take, 
with one group urging abandonment of fault grounds and a move toward recognizing the idea of 
irremediable marital breakdown and the other seeking to maintain the status quo (Stone, 1990). 
Reform came about in the mid-1960s when two groups considered the divorce law and issued 
influential recommendations. The Archbishop's Group, formed by the Archbishop of Canterbury 
and including clerics and lay members of the Church of England, called for recognition of 
"irretrievable matrimonial breakdown" (Archbishop's Group, 1966). The Law Commission, 
consisting of judges, lawyers, and legal scholars, agreed with the Archbishop's Group that the 
time had arrived to allow divorce on faultless grounds (Law Commission, 1966). The major 
difference between the two groups was the church group's preference for a divorce procedure 
that relied upon extensive participation by judges and the secular group's reluctance to further 
burden the judiciary (Glendon, 1989). The recommendations of the two groups ultimately 
formed the foundation for the Divorce Reform Act 1969. 
The English Divorce Reform Act 1969 was a dramatic change and it proved influential in 
continental Europe and in the United States. With the Act, Parliament did not, however, actually 
abolish fault grounds for divorce. Section 1(1) of the Divorce Reform Act 1969 declares that, 
henceforth, the only basis for divorce would be "irretrievable breakdown." Section 1(2), 
however, describes the five ways irretrievable breakdown can be proven and three are traditional 
fault grounds: adultery, desertion, and cruelty. 
Liberal though it was, the Divorce Reform Act 1969 was cautious in important ways. Mutual 
consent divorce was available only after a couple had lived apart for 2 years unless the couple 
could show exceptional hardship; unilateral no-fault divorce required a 5-year separation unless 
the petitioner showed particular hardship or exceptional depravity by the respondent (Glendon, 
1987). Even though substantial obstacles remained, many more couples in England and Wales 
sought divorces after the 1969 Act (Cretney & Masson, 1990). Interestingly, though, most of 
these divorcing couples (more than two-thirds in 1984) have continued to rely on fault grounds, 
perhaps because this is the easier route to obtaining a divorce (Glendon, 1989). 
The Divorce Reform Act 1969 required judges to inquire into the facts of each divorce petition. 
However, by the mid-1970s, serious inquests were rarely held in cases of uncontested divorce 
and it was typical for a divorce to be merely an administrative act performed by a clerk (Cretney 
& Masson, 1990). Although the law provides English courts with the option of denying a divorce 
petition (used only by spouses who have been separated for at least 5 years) in cases where 
divorce would lead to "grave financial or other hardship," divorces are seldom denied on this 
ground. This defense is rarely successful because the hardship must be shown to have resulted 
from the legal divorce itself, above and beyond any hardship resulting from the separation that 
has inevitably occurred before. 
A 1984 amendment to the English divorce law decreased from 3 or 5 years to 1 year the required 
term of separation and eliminated the exception for hardship (Cretney & Masson, 1990). Thus, 
divorce is commonly available after only a year's separation, and, in some fault cases, even less 
(Glendon, 1989). 
The progression to simpler divorce in England and Wales is not without its critics, perhaps 
because Britain has the highest divorce rate in Western Europe (Glendon, 1989). Freeman 
(1991a) suggests that, due to pressure from many who believe that liberal English divorce laws 
are leading to a crumbling of British and Welsh family life, there will likely be a more restrictive 
divorce law enacted in England in the near future. The Law Commission has recommended that 
couples be required to wait an extra year for a "period of consideration and reflection." This 
period is designed to insure that the marriage is indeed irreparable. To aid in their deliberation, 
couples would be encouraged to participate in counseling and mediation services. 
France. The history of French divorce law largely reflects what has been called "les deux 
Frances," the conservative, Catholic France and the individualistic, liberal France (Stoljar, 1989). 
In the first decade after the Revolution, French divorce law was inordinately liberal for its time, 
as it allowed divorce with mutual consent or for incompatibility (Rheinstein, 1971). The 
pendulum soon swung to the other extreme and between 1816 and 1884, French law did not 
recognize divorce, although couples could be granted a judicial separation (Phillips, 1988). The 
1884 law that reintroduced divorce included three bases: adultery, sentence for a serious crime, 
and grave violation of marital duties (cruelty or abuse) (Glendon, 1989). The law remained 
unchanged for the next 92 years. 
Soon after the English Divorce Reform Act 1969, the French government began considering a 
similar major divorce reform. Again, there were "les deux Frances," with the liberals seeking a 
purely no-fault system and the conservatives arguing that such legislation would lead to 
horrendous consequences for wives and Western societies in general (Glendon, 1989). The result 
of the cultural struggle was the 1975 law (Civil Code, 1975, France). 
The mixed-grounds law recognizes two forms of divorce by mutual consent: "divorce-
convention" and "divorce-resignation." The former is a divorce to which both spouses agree and 
the latter one is initiated by one spouse and acquiesced to by the other (Glendon, 1989). Divorce-
convention is the more popular, although it is by no means a simple or quick divorce procedure. 
A couple seeking divorce-convention must present to a judge a detailed plan for the economic 
and custodial consequences of the divorce, and court supervision of the divorcing couple can, in 
practice, be extensive (Civil Code, 1975, France; Ietswaart, 1989). Divorce-resignation was 
intended primarily to accommodate a spouse who accepts the divorce but for religious or ethical 
reasons chooses not to participate actively (Glendon, 1989). It also requires extensive judicial 
supervision. 
A third no-fault ground for divorce in France is "prolonged disruption of the life in common." 
With this form of divorce, one spouse can divorce the other if there has been a separation of at 
least 6 years or the divorced spouse has been mentally ill for at least 6 years (Civil Code, 1975, 
France). This article of the amended Civil Code was the most controversial. Conservatives 
forecast innumerable divorces in which middle-aged men cast off their wives for younger 
women (Glendon, 1989). Although, initially, this form of divorce was chosen quite often by 
couples, it is seldom used at present, probably because it is quite costly (Glendon, 1989). The 
petitioner is assumed to be at fault and is, therefore, at a disadvantage with respect to the 
financial aftermath of divorce. 
Finally, the 1975 reform retained the traditional fault grounds, but in a modified form. Only two 
such grounds remain: violation of the duties and obligations of marriage and sentence for a 
serious crime (Civil Code, 1975, France). The traditional grounds--adultery, cruelty, desertion--
fall under the ambit of the former. As with the English, French couples in practice continue to 
rely heavily on fault grounds in seeking divorce, although mutual consent divorce is becoming 
increasingly popular (Ietswaart, 1989; Rubellin-Devichi, 1990), particularly in liberal Paris 
(Glendon, 1989). 
French law also has a hardship clause, which, according to Glendon (1989), is used more often 
by judges in the French provinces than by English judges. Furthermore, the seriousness with 
which the French take divorce is evidenced by the broad way that they interpret hardship. 
Hardship is not just based on financial considerations, as it is almost exclusively in England 
(Cretney & Masson, 1990), but also on physical and mental well-being (Glendon, 1989). 
However, in Paris, again reflecting "les deux Frances," judges seldom use the hardship clause. 
Although French divorce law has incorporated many of the liberal reforms that characterize the 
United States and Britain, the process of obtaining a divorce in France remains lengthy and 
subject to considerable judicial control. Although several varieties of divorce are available, a 
segment of the population remains opposed to divorce for religious reasons. When serious 
marital difficulties arise, these individuals may make use of the separation provisions in French 
law, which have remained important even after divorce was legalized in 1884 (Glendon, 1989). 
Sweden. Whereas the decade between 1966 and 1976 marked dramatic changes in divorce laws 
in much of the Western world, in many ways, the changes emulated what had occurred decades 
earlier in Sweden. Swedish divorce law remained largely unchanged between 1734 and 1915 
(Rheinstein, 1971). The pre-1915 law followed the precepts of the Lutheran State Church, 
allowing divorce only on the strict fault grounds off adultery or desertion. However, monarchs 
liberally granted divorces and couples found other ways to obtain divorces (e.g., migratory 
divorces in Copenhagen) (Glendon, 1989). 
A law revision commission examining the divorce issue in 1913 determined that the proper basis 
for divorce should be breakdown of the marriage and that marriages that have broken down 
should not be held together by external force (Glendon, 1989). The ensuing 1915 Marriage Code 
of Sweden introduced three no-fault grounds, while retaining the traditional fault grounds and 
adding several (Rheinstein, 1971). Under the most popular of the no-fault grounds, spouses 
petitioning together for divorce had only to prove that they had been separated for a year 
(Rheinstein, 1971). Nevertheless, many divorces were still premised on fault grounds, which 
Rheinstein (1971) attributed to the greater speed with which such divorces were granted and the 
possible financial and child-related (i.e., custody) benefits for the petitioning party. 
In 1969, the Swedish Minister of Justice empaneled a committee to draft a new, more 
progressive divorce law that would never force a person to continue to live in a marriage against 
his or her will (Bohndorf et al., 1970; Sundberg, 1975). The committee prepared a law that 
eliminated fault grounds and set the maximum waiting period at 6 months. Although the 
maximum waiting period was 6 months, most divorces were .to be immediate (Marriage Code, 
1973, Sweden). The law was based on the principle that the wishes of either of the spouses 
should always be respected (Anderson, Churchill, & Hampton, 1973). According to Glendon 
(1989), several other Scandinavian countries followed Sweden's lead, although with minor 
variations, such as Finland's mandatory 6-month waiting period. 
Other Western countries. Although we focus on the United States, England and Wales, France, 
and Sweden, there are several other notable features of Western divorce law. Three 
predominantly Catholic countries have somewhat more restrictive divorce laws than those 
already reviewed. Italy had no provision for divorce until 1970 (Phillips, 1988). In its present 
form, the Italian divorce law combines fault and no-fault grounds, but remains one of the most 
restrictive in Europe (Phillips, 1988). Spain first recognized divorce in 1981, and now its laws 
recognize both fault and no-fault bases for divorce (Glendon, 1989). Ireland, alone among 
Western nations, does not allow divorce (Dillon, 1993) 
Summary. There are a number of trends evident in the laws pertaining to obtaining a divorce in 
Western countries. Most countries have moved away from traditional fault grounds in the last 30 
years, although their practical experiences suggest that those grounds will remain important and 
utilized. Laws in most U.S. states, England and Wales, France, and Sweden more readily accept 
the notion that marriages may be "irretrievably" damaged through no fault of either spouse. 
Rather than requiring continuation of such marriages, current laws seem to be designed to allow 
marriages to end with less acrimony than they did under fault-based divorce laws. 
Laws Pertaining to the Aftermath of Divorce 
While most of the reforms already noted worked to make divorce more easily attained, a reverse 
trend has occurred in the area of postdivorce support and child custody decisions. In most 
Western countries, less restrictive divorce laws have been associated with greater state interest in 
the legal effects of marriage termination (Glendon, 1989) and increased state intrusion into 
family life (Jacob, 1988). 
One theme pervades the area of economic and custodial issues following divorce: With the 
waning of fault-based regimes, courts face more difficult decisions because there are fewer 
"guilty" spouses against whom to make awards. In place of the standard of benefiting the 
"victim" and punishing the "guilty," courts must now attempt to reach decisions that are 
equitable and just to both parties. 
Below, we review the current status of laws regulating spousal support, child support, and child 
custody in the surveyed countries. Although these areas are theoretically separate, they are often 
combined in practice (e.g., spousal support and child support are intertwined when divorced 
couples have young children) (Glendon, 1989). Furthermore, these issues must be considered 
within the context of the antra's social assistance programs, which provide more support to 
divorced families in European and Scandinavian countries than in the United States. 
The United States. Property settlement in the United States is marked by considerable discretion 
by the court and the divorcing couple. Two systems predominate, the common law system and 
the community property system (Jacob, 1988). 
More than 40 states retain the common law system. Historically, common law property division 
allowed each spouse to retain what he or she had before becoming married and what he or she 
gained during the marriage by gift, inheritance, or personal earnings (Chambers, 1985; Krause, 
1977). That which is jointly acquired marital property is divided, usually according to some form 
of equitable distribution (Phillips, 1988). 
Community property laws, at least in theory, require that separately acquired property as well as 
jointly acquired marital property be evenly divided (Oldham, 1992). After recent legal reforms, 
however, the distinction between the common law and community property systems has, in 
many respects, become blurred. Most states now allow courts to equitably divide some or all of 
the property owned by the parties at the time of divorce. In fact, states in the United States are 
similar to England in not drawing a clear distinction in practice between marital assets and 
spousal support. For example, spouses may be given more property if they are granted less 
spousal support or vice versa. 
Although courts in most states retain discretion in matters of spousal support (Glendon, 1989), 
most states now regard alimony as rehabilitative and short term (Oster, 1987). Although fault has 
generally been eliminated from consideration in obtaining a divorce, some states have retained 
fault grounds for property division (Jacob, 1988). Missouri, for example, has a no-fault divorce 
law, but has retained fault as a consideration in property division. 
Particularly in those states that do not consider fault in the division of property, no-fault divorce 
works to reduce blame assessment, which may reduce benefits to wives who would likely have 
received larger support packages in the past under fault-based divorce laws (Jacob, 1988). As a 
re-suit, awards of alimony have become increasingly rare (Oldham, 1992), with only 10% to 
20% of divorced spouses receiving spousal support awards (Garrison, 1990). 
Noncustodial parents in the United States are often ordered to pay child support, but the amounts 
are typically low. Further, child support awards are often unpaid (Buehler, in press), an 
observation based primarily on the reports of custodial parents. However, it should be noted that 
the extent of the noncompliance problem depends on the custodial status of the informant; 
Braver et al. (1993) found that noncustodial parents reported paying 84% of what they owed in 
child support, compared to custodial parents' reports that they received only 68% of what they 
were owed. Nevertheless, even if one bases the extent of the noncompliance problem on reports 
from noncustodial parents, children in the United States receive less financial support from their 
noncustodial parents than they have been determined to need, although the extent of this problem 
has improved with the passage of recent legislation. 
The federal Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984 (1984) required states to establish 
mandatory wage withholding if payments were more than 1 month late, to establish numeric 
formulas and guidelines for the determination of child support awards (although judges were not 
required to use these), and to set up several procedures designed to improve compliance. The 
federal Family Support Act of 1988 (1989) further strengthened the 1984 Child Support 
Enforcement Amendments. This Act required states to pass laws that made the child support 
guidelines mandatory and established mandatory withholding of all support payments by January 
1, 1994 (Garfinkel & Melli, 1990). According to O'Donnell (1990), the 1988 Act is likely to help 
accomplish the goals of the 1984 Amendments--uniformity of award amounts, adequacy of 
awards, and compliance. Currently, courts are establishing rules for when and how they can 
depart from the child support award formulas mandated by the Family Support Act (Melli, 
1992). 
The presumption that children would fare best if they lived with their mothers following divorce 
was reflected in both the laws and practices of most states until the 1970s. Since that time, most 
states have enacted statutes that are not based on maternal preference, but are gender neutral in 
that they are based on the "best interests" of the child. Furthermore, increasing numbers of states 
are allowing and encouraging joint custody (Jacob, 1988; Walker & Elrod, 1993), which 
involves both parents having decision-making authority for their children even if the child lives 
predominantly with one parent. California, as the first state to institute a statute that favored joint 
custody (Weitzman, 1985) was again the pioneer. In practice, however, despite the fact that state 
laws emphasize joint custody to varying extents (Weitzman, 1985), an overwhelming majority of 
custody awards are made solely to mothers (Maccoby, Buchanan, Mnookin, & Dombusch, 
1993). 
England and Wales. In the last 20 years, English and Welsh property division law has become 
similar to the laws of most American common law property states in a major respect: discretion 
(erethey & Masson, 1990). Judges and registrars who settle property matters on divorce have a 
number of options, which can create unpredictability for the couple (Grossen, 1986). 
The Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 set forth more than a half dozen 
considerations, ranging from the standard of living of the parties before the breakdown to the 
conduct of the spouses if it would be inequitable to ignore such conduct. As in the United States, 
property settlement and spousal support are generally treated together. As Glendon (1989) 
indicates, even though spousal self-sufficiency is an explicitly stated goal, English law more 
readily imposes financial obligations after divorce on ex-spouses than do the laws of many other 
Western nations. 
The 1984 amendments did not constitute a substantial change, but were designed to change the 
guiding principle underlying financial matters following divorce. Instead of trying to place the 
spouses in the same financial position that they would be in had the divorce not occurred, a new 
principle was developed: the courts were to give "first consideration" to any minor children in 
making financial arrangements. Although English courts had already been giving minor children 
primary consideration, the amendments were designed to underscore the importance of this trend 
(Glendon, 1989). Unfortunately, as in the United States, the financial provisions have not worked 
well in England. Most single mothers and their families move into poverty following divorce 
(Eekelaar & MacLean, 1986). 
Recognizing this problem, the English government published a "White Paper" on child 
maintenance, which advocated instituting predictable child support formulas, relieving the 
custodial parent of the burden of collecting payments, and more rigorously enforcing support 
orders (Freeman, 1991b). In 1991, the Child Support Act 1991 was enacted to address these 
issues. The Act limits court discretion in determining child support award levels by establishing 
a formula that is to be used in most cases, sets up a Child Support Agency to find nonpaying 
parents and to improve compliance, and establishes the principle that children should share their 
parents' standard of living (Freeman, 1992). 
With respect to child custody, the Children Act 1989 was adopted to integrate and simplify much 
of British law as it applied to children. A major premise of the Act is that the best interests of the 
children are paramount in all proceedings (Elliott, 1991). The Act codified a new concept in 
English law, "parental responsibility," maintaining as its theme the notion of "parenthood as a 
continuing or enduring status" (Bainham, 1990, p. 209). The Act regards children no longer as 
their parents' property, but rather as their parents' responsibility. Thus, the expectation is that 
both parents will retain parental authority following divorce and that the courts will be concerned 
primarily with determining the residence of the children (i.e., residence orders) (Duquette, 1992). 
Based on the preferences of most divorcing couples, most children live with their mothers 
(Cretney & Masson, 1990). 
France. French property division law has remained largely unchanged from the years before the 
1975 reform. Ordinarily, spouses evenly split marital property, unless they decide otherwise by 
marital contract or divorce settlement (Glendon, 1989). Beyond this commonality, French law 
provides for differing systems of financial consequences for the different types of divorce. 
The thrust of the law is aimed at spousal support obligations. Under the pre-1976 fault system, 
only the "innocent" spouse could be granted support (Glendon, 1989). Because one of the themes 
of the 1975 reform was the end of acrimony in divorce, the law bluntly stated that divorce ends 
any support obligations. 
There remains, however, a system of compensatory payment, usually set forth by agreement 
between the spouses (Glendon, 1989; Ietswaart, 1989). These are lump-sum payments, which are 
made at the time of divorce, to minimize postdivorce conflict between the spouses. Even though 
such payments are rare (only about 10% of divorced wives receive either spousal support or a 
compensatory payment; Glendon, 1989), when they are made, they are not intended to be 
punitive; rather, they seek to mitigate the disruption the divorce creates for each party (Civil 
Code, 1975, France). Because most debtors do not have the assets to make lump-sum payments, 
the compensatory payment--when it is ordered--is typically made in periodic installments 
(Glendon, 1989). Because these payments are rarely ordered and judges are never required to 
order them, the law illustrates the French emphasis on spousal self-sufficiency following divorce. 
In the case of divorce on joint petition, the law requires that the parties submit with the petition 
an agreement describing the economic effects of their divorce (Civil Code, 1975, France). A 
judge has great discretion to reject a financial agreement if he or she finds it inequitable (Civil 
Code, 1975, France; Glendon, 1989). Because of this judicial discretion and the fact that all 
marital assets must be liquidated so that they can be divided at the time of the divorce (a time-
consuming process), many French couples who agree on the terms of the divorce do not proceed 
by joint position (Glendon, 1989). 
The cessation of support obligations does not apply in the case of divorce for prolonged 
disruption of the life in common. The French law imposes a full duty of support on the "guilty" 
spouse until the other remarries or cohabits with another (Glendon, 1989). This support order can 
be changed at any time as the resources and needs of the ex-spouses change. 
Child support is similar for all types of divorce. Because parents remain financially responsible 
for their children following divorce, nonresidential parents must contribute financially to the 
support of their children. Child support is awarded in 75% of divorces involving minor children 
and is collected through a relatively efficient system whereby payments are automatically 
deducted from the debtor's wages. However; as in the other countries surveyed, the amounts 
awarded are often less than that needed to raise children and there is a substantial noncompliance 
problem (Glendon, 1989; Ietswaart, 1989). Noncompliance may arise when a debtor is 
unemployed or is difficult to locate due to frequent changes in his or her place of employment. 
When a debtor defaults, a 1984 statute dictates that public agencies will make the required 
monthly payments (up to a certain amount) and take over the responsibility of collecting the 
unpaid amount of support. 
As of 1987, the French Civil Code did not specifically refer to "custody" but rather allowed 
parental authority to remain with both parents (similar to joint custody in the United States) or 
with only the "custodial" parent (Glendon, 1989). Despite this provision that both parents can 
retain authority over their children, as in the other countries surveyed in this article, most child 
custody determinations in France result in maternal placement (Glendon, 1989; Ietswaart, 1989). 
Sweden. As with acquiring a divorce, Sweden is more permissive in dealing with the effects of 
divorce than other Western countries. Swedish law espouses a "clean break" theory of divorce, 
by indicating that each spouse should be responsible for his or her own support following 
divorce. As a result, spousal support payments are almost nonexistent (Glendon, 1989). 
In Sweden, like other Nordic countries, all property, no matter the source, is subject to even 
distribution following divorce (Glendon, 1989). There are exceptions, however, when a court 
finds that such distribution would be inequitable. Additionally, under certain conditions, the 
spouse who most needs it will be awarded the dwelling and its basic contents (Glendon, 1989). 
To further illustrate the individualistic nature of Swedish law, unlike in many U.S. states, 
pensions are considered "special property" of individual spouses and are not divisible upon 
divorce. 
Although basically nonintervening in other aspects of divorce, Swedish law retains myriad 
regulations concerning child support postdivorce. Periodically, updated guidelines are provided 
to judges to keep them informed about child-maintenance costs (Glendon, 1989). The child 
support awards are indexed to inflation and may be modified when the circumstances of one or 
both of the parents change. Sweden has a rigorous and successful enforcement system. When the 
debtor defaults, the government advances child support payments to the custodial parent and 
assumes responsibility for collecting the payments. A further buffer for children is that Sweden 
has more forms of public family assistance than do other non-Scandinavian countries, including 
generous child allowances, housing allowances, and public health insurance. Recently, new 
models have been proposed to refine and update the important system of "maintenance 
allowances" to children in single-parent families (Saldeen, 1991). 
As in the other countries surveyed, most children remain in the custody of their mothers 
following divorce (Glendon, 1989). New legislation in the area of child custody has recently 
been passed that encourages "cooperative discussions" between parents to foster mutual 
compromise (Saldeen, 1992). 
Summary. In terms of the legal effects of divorce, there is a clear movement toward requiring 
greater spousal financial independence in all of the countries surveyed. Support, if it is granted, 
is thought to be a short-term aid to help the needy spouse achieve financial independence. 
With respect to child support, the nations surveyed have all taken steps to improve the plight of 
children following divorce. All have strengthened their commitment to the notion that both 
parents should remain financially responsible for the support of children following divorce. 
Recent changes have attempted to make child support awards more uniform and more adequate 
through the use of clearer guidelines and formulas and to improve compliance by noncustodial 
parents through improved enforcement. France and Sweden have adopted procedures to ensure 
that children receive the necessary financial support if noncustodial parents do not comply with 
their orders. 
However, there are variations among the countries in how well single-divorced-mother families 
are supported. France and Sweden, with their greater levels of public assistance, have been 
relatively more successful than the United States and England in providing for single, 
unemployed mothers (Eekelaar, 1991). The United States emphasizes spousal independence, but 
has been faulted for not establishing the economic support system necessary to realize this goal 
(Glendon, 1989). 
In the area of child custody, most nations have adopted the principle that custody decisions 
should be based on the "child's best interests." While many nations have adopted gender-neutral 
child custody laws that encourage shared decision making (e.g., joint custody), the experience of 
all surveyed Western nations is that most couples prefer to give the mother the primary decision-
making authority following divorce. 
THE EFFECTS OF LEGAL CHANGES ON FAMILY MEMBERS: AN IMPORTANT 
QUESTION WITHOUT A CLEAR ANSWER 
An important question naturally follows from a survey of how divorce laws have changed over 
time: What are the effects of these changes on the family lives of parents and children following 
divorce? As meaningful a question as this is, it defies an objective, empirically based answer. In 
this section, we argue that there is no single, un-ambiguous reply to this question because the 
answer is inextricably intertwined with the values of those who review the available evidence. 
Although researchers have examined the effects of various provisions of divorce law, they often 
reach conflicting conclusions. Furthermore, those who interpret the work of researchers (e.g., 
policy specialists, legal scholars) have drawn differing conclusions from the available empirical 
studies. In addition to the typical reasons why differing conclusions are drawn in an area (e.g., 
differing research methodologies, measures, and statistical procedures), we argue that the values 
of researchers and those who interpret their work influence the inferences they draw from a body 
of knowledge (Belsky & Eggebeen, 1991; Fine, Schwebel, & Myers, 1987; Miller, 1992). To 
demonstrate this point, we provide three examples of instances when individuals have reached 
different conclusions regarding the effects of changes in divorce laws on family members. 
Examples of Differing Conclusions About the Effects of Changes in Divorce Laws 
Frequency of divorce. Although there is widespread agreement that divorce rates rose 
substantially in the last 30 years in all of the countries surveyed in this article (Glendon, 1989), 
there is a lack of consensus on the extent to which the increases in divorce rates were fueled by 
the advent of no-fault divorce laws. On the one hand, some have argued that these increases in 
the prevalence of divorce are unrelated to legal changes. These scholars have noted that increases 
in divorce rates began before the no-fault movement (Phillips, 1988); that spouses live longer 
today than they did in earlier times, which increases the chances of marital conflict (and 
divorce); that the declining role of marriage and family as a basis for economic security has 
raised spouses' expectations and standards for what they should obtain from the institution of 
marriage and weakened the commitment of some spouses to marriage (Phillips, 1988); and that 
the easy access to marriage that characterizes present marriage laws increases the divorce rates 
because unprepared and incompatible spouses--who might not have married in the past--are at 
high risk for divorce. 
On the other hand, others have suggested that changes in the divorce laws have played a role in 
increased divorce rates. It is possible that easier legal access to divorce has contributed to the 
changing view of marriage as a contractual relationship that exists as long as it satisfies both 
parties rather than as a lifelong commitment (Glen-don, 1989; White, 1990). This changing view 
of marriage, in turn, may increase the likelihood of divorce. In fact, some researchers have 
concluded that no-fault divorce led to increases in divorce rates in some countries (Balakrishnan, 
Rao, Lapierre-Adamcyk, & Krotki, 1987). 
Financial aftermath of divorce for mothers with custody. There is considerable consensus that 
single mothers suffer the largest share of financial loss following divorce (Ietswaart, 1989; 
Phillips, 1988; Weitzman, 1985). However, differing (although not necessarily mutually 
exclusive) explanations have been posited for how changes in divorce laws affected this 
phenomenon: (a) The proliferation of no-fault divorce laws was responsible for the deterioration 
in mothers' financial standing (Weitzman, 1985); (b) mothers' postdivorce financial difficulties 
began before the no-fault divorce reform movement. and, thus, were determined by factors other 
than changes in divorce laws (Garrison, 1990); and (c) mothers' financial hardships postdivorce 
are partially caused by a lack of occupational opportunities for women (Fineman, 1991; Seltzer 
& Garfinkel, 1990). 
Effects on children of laws governing custody. This debate centers on the relative benefits of two 
different norms: a mother-custody norm, which implies that mothers are granted sole custody 
unless extenuating circumstances (e.g., the mother is judged to be unfit) dictate otherwise and a 
gender-neutral, "best interests of the child," norm, which implies that the child should be in the 
custody of whichever parent (or both parents) will best provide for the child's needs. Two legal 
scholars had an illustrative interchange concerning the relative merits of each standard 
(Chambers, 1984; Fine-man & Opie, 1987). Although each used social science data to support 
the positions taken, they reached differing conclusions. Chambers (1984) concluded that there 
was insufficient evidence to support a change in legislation away from a gender-neutral standard, 
whereas Fineman and Opie (1987) concluded that there was insufficient evidence to refute the 
notion that mothers were better custodial parents than fathers. 
Recent studies that have compared children's adjustment in different custodial arrangements have 
generally found few differences (Kline, Tschann, Johnston, & Wallerstein, t989; Maccoby et al., 
1993). However, this question is extremely complex and difficult to investigate (see a discussion 
by Maccoby et al., 1993) and there is some evidence that it is the amount of parental conflict in 
the postdivorce family, rather than the custodial arrangement per se, that is most strongly related 
to children's and adolescents' postdivorce adjustment (Kline et al., 1989). 
These three examples illustrate that it is extremely difficult to scientifically confirm a given 
position pertaining to how legal changes affect family life. As noted, this difficulty is not only 
due to the theoretical and methodological challenges in investigating such complex relations, but 
also because individuals have differing values that lead them to draw differing conclusions . We 
now turn to an examination of the specific values that may play a role in how one evaluates the 
effects of legal changes on family members. 
Values that Influence Evaluations of the Effects of Changes in Divorce Laws 
A number of specific value dimensions are considered below, presented in order from the most 
general to the most specific. 
Individual rights. On one end of this continuum is the view that individual rights are of 
paramount importance and that the social good is of secondary concern. On the other end of this 
dimension is the view that it is the social good that is of critical importance, whereas the rights of 
individuals are of secondary import. The countries surveyed in this article differ on this 
dimension. The United States, as a collective entity, emphasizes the notion of individual rights. 
In fact, the United States Supreme Court, in Boddie v. Connecticut (1971), came close to 
supporting a constitutional right to divorce, a right that cannot coexist with hardship clauses 
(Glendon, 1987). Sweden also places a high value on individual rights, but has an extensive 
public support network. 
According to Glendon (1989), the United States and Sweden base their laws on an "ideology of 
tolerance" (p. 297). Instead of taking a moral stance on family-related issues, these countries 
tolerate a wide range of diverse behaviors and orient their laws to provide an outer bound on 
what is acceptable behavior. By contrast, England and France place relatively less emphasis on 
individual rights than do the other countries considered here. Lawmakers in these countries tend 
to devise laws to correspond to social behavior and beliefs. 
View of marriage. On one end of this continuum is the view that marriage is gender based, with 
husbands as the breadwinners and wives as the homemakers. According to this view, marriage 
involves a lasting commitment between two individuals whose interdependence during marriage 
leaves at least one spouse dependent on the other following divorce. On the other end of the 
continuum is the view of marriage as a partnership between two equal individuals who, although 
interdependent during marriage, have the potential to be independent after divorce (Fineman, 
1991). According to this view, marriage is a partnership between two individuals that can be 
ended at will by either party. 
Nature of marital breakdown. The traditional view of marital breakdown was reflected in the 
view that one spouse, through his or her transgressions, was responsible for marital rift. This 
perspective implies that the "guilty" spouse should be financially responsible for the plight of the 
"innocent" spouse. By contrast, the more recent view is that marriages can break down in the 
absence of one spouse being clearly responsible. This view is consistent with a family systems 
notion of marital disruption, which holds that the system as a whole may deteriorate without any 
one partner being specifically responsible. 
Spousal self-sufficiency. On one end of this continuum is the view that ex-spouses should work 
toward the goal of being independent from each other following divorce. This "clean break" view 
is based on the notion that individuals will be better off in the long run if they must establish 
their independence immediately after divorce. On the other end of the continuum is the belief 
that, for some spouses (typically women), longstanding devotion to work within the home and 
absence from the labor force for an extended period of time make self-sufficiency an 
unachievable goal. According to this view, power differentials that existed during marriage 
continue after divorce and these differentials place many women at a substantial disadvantage in 
the labor force. 
Children's needs and the financial well-being of the noncustodial parent. On the one end of this 
continuum is the view that children's needs should be given the highest priority following 
divorce and that these needs should be met before those of either of the biological parents. On 
the other extreme of this dimension is the perspective that the noncustodial parent should be 
allowed to maintain a reasonable standard of living so that he or she can begin the process of 
adapting to life after divorce. 
To illustrate how these differing perspectives are embodied in policy decisions, we note that 
three models have been used to determine child support award levels (Rettig, Christensen, & 
Dahl, 1991): (a) the costs approach, which suggests that parents should share what are assumed 
to be the fixed and measurable costs of raising a child; (b) the income shares approach, which 
suggests that a child should share the standard of living of each parent following divorce (i.e., 
children receive a level of support based on the sum of both parent's incomes, with each parent 
contributing a prorated portion); and (c) the taxation approach, which suggests that the child 
support award level should be based on a proportion of the noncustodial parent's net or gross 
income. The income shares and taxation approaches are more consistent with protecting the 
financial well-being of children than is the costs approach, whereas the costs approach is closer 
to the view that noncustodial parents' welfare should be protected. 
The role of government in assisting family members after divorce. On the one end of this 
continuum is the view that divorce is a private family matter and that the individuals involved--
rather than the government--should be responsible for providing for themselves. On the other 
extreme of this dimension is the perspective that children and custodial parents' needs are so 
great that government intervention is warranted to insure that they have an adequate standard of 
living. Sweden and, to a lesser extent, France and England have public welfare systems that are 
more consistent with the latter view than are the systems in states within the United States. 
Parents' involvement in decision making following divorce. On one end of this continuum is the 
view that it is generally best for children when courts allow parents free choice about who will 
have decision-making authority regarding the child. A corollary of this view is that, because 
most couples in all of the countries surveyed choose to give mothers sole child custody, 
childrens' best interests are advanced when they are in the custody of their mothers. On the other 
end of this dimension is the perspective that it is preferable for both parents to remain actively 
involved with their children following divorce, and that granting both parents decision-making 
authority is one means to achieve this end. According to this view, although parents' initial 
preferences are relevant, parents should be actively encouraged to accept joint custody 
arrangements. 
THE RELATIONS BETWEEN CULTURAL VALUES AND DIVORCE LAWS 
The previous section suggested that the inevitable influence of values makes it very difficult to 
provide an objective evaluation of the effects of changes in divorce laws on family members. 
This recognition of the importance of values may also shed light on how changes in divorce laws 
occur and how legal changes, once they are instituted, may influence cultural values. In this 
section, to gain some insight into the process of how divorce laws change over time, we explore 
the nature of the relation between cultural values and divorce laws. 
A theme underlying our analysis is that there is a complex relation between cultural values and 
divorce laws. Perhaps the strongest evidence that supports this claim is the observation that 
divorce laws cycle over time between restrictiveness and openness. In the selected Western 
countries surveyed here, divorce laws have changed from more restrictive to more open (and 
possibly to more restrictive again in the near future) in the face of changing cultural values in 
different epochs in history. For example, French laws changed from being very liberal before and 
immediately after the French Revolution, to being quite conservative from 1816 until 1884, and 
again to being more liberal after 1975. More recently, the 1960s and 1970s, in all of the Western 
world, were years of political turmoil, when formerly accepted social conventions were 
challenged and often rejected. Concurrently, in all of the Western countries surveyed in this 
article, divorce laws became more open and less restrictive. In the 1980s and early 1990s, there 
has been an increased challenge to the liberal reforms of the 1960s and 1970s and, to varying 
degrees in the different countries, conservative causes have gained support (e.g., the recent calls 
for a return to "family values" in the United States). At the same time, there has been some 
suggestion that divorce laws will become somewhat more restrictive in some of the surveyed 
countries (Freeman, 1991a). 
Our review of divorce laws, as well as the demonstration that these laws change cyclically over 
time, suggests that the complex relation between cultural values and laws affecting divorce 
involves multiple causal mechanisms. Although an extensive discussion of these mechanisms is 
beyond the scope of this article, a brief description is presented below to illustrate the complexity 
involved. At the risk of oversimplification, two causal directions are illustrated below: cultural 
values causing legal change, and legal changes causing changes in cultural values. 
Cultural values causing legal changes. In this causal direction, cultural forces eventually become 
sufficiently powerful to lead to legal change. These cultural forces are complex and intertwined 
and include the following: popular opinion regarding divorce; legislators' desires to make the law 
more consistent with the behavior of couples whose marriages have broken down (i.e., reducing 
the need for spouses to fabricate stories of adultery); changes in the extent to which certain 
religious denominations accept that marriages may dissolve; the desires of professionals 
involved in divorce to make the process less adversarial; changes in the ideological and political 
persuasions of legislators in power; and the impact of special influence groups, such as fathers' 
fights and women's rights groups (Glen-don, 1989; Jacob, 1988; Phillips, 1988). 
It is interesting to note that some of these cultural forces can be sufficiently powerful to lead to 
legislative change in the absence of supportive public opinion. For example, Italian law was 
changed to recognize divorce in 1970; although public opinion was opposed to divorce at that 
time (Phillips, 1988). Further, even the frequent occurrence of marital separation may not be 
sufficient to precipitate reform. Even though divorce is not legal in Ireland, marital breakdown 
and separation is a common occurrence (Dillon, 1993). Thus, even when social custom suggests 
that marriages can and do deteriorate, the Irish ideal that divorce should be prohibited was strong 
enough to defeat a referendum that would have legalized divorce in 1986 (Dillon, 1993). 
To what extent are writings from social scientists an important cultural force that influences legal 
change? Although there is relatively little written that documents this influence, there is some 
evidence that some conceptual writings and empirical studies have had a role in legal change. An 
influential book by Goldstein, Freud, and Sol-nit (1979) argued, based on psychoanalytic theory, 
that stability in the child's early relationships should be the primary factor to consider in child 
placement settings. Because of their emphasis on stability, they argued that only one parent 
should have custody of the child. This book became quite influential and was widely cited in 
court decisions pertaining to custody and visitation (Jacob, 1988), although it was based on a 
conceptual and not a data-based analysis. A book by Roman and Haddad (1978) that took the 
opposing stance--that fathers should be allowed to have greater involvement in their children's 
lives through joint custody--stimulated discussion of joint custody in legal circles but was not 
cited as often in legal cases as was Goldstein et al's book (Jacob, 1988). 
There is also some evidence that empirical studies have had some influence on legal reform. 
Wallerstein (1980) and Hetherington, Cox, and Cox (1978) found that children from divorced 
families fared best when they maintained contact with both parents, if the ex-spouses could 
cooperate around childrearing issues. According to Johnston (1993), these findings were used to 
support the positions of those who advocated for the development of joint custody legislation in 
California. In addition, there is also some indication that advocates of particular legislative 
changes may interpret research findings in such a way that supports their positions. For example, 
findings that suggested that children fared better when they were in their mothers' custody than 
when they were in mandatory joint custody arrangements (Johnston, Kline, & Tschann, 1989) 
were misused to justify the position that joint custody in general, whether mandatory or optional, 
was less beneficial to children than was sole custody (Johnston, 1993; see also Simon, 1991). 
Legal changes affecting cultural values. In the other causal direction, legal changes may evoke 
changes in cultural values over time. According to Glendon (1989), laws that reflect the 
temporary resolution of conflicting interests often come to "have a life of their own, producing 
'logical' and 'necessary' consequences" (p. 34). For example, although the rapid movement to no-
fault divorce that took place in the United States was certainly fueled by changes in cultural 
values (e.g., increased support for individuals' rights to leave a marriage, women's rights, spousal 
independence, and marital breakup without "guilt"), the no-fault divorce laws clearly contributed 
to changed perceptions of marriage and divorce. As opposed to the belief that marriage is a 
lifetime commitment that involves continuing responsibilities of each spouse to the other, the 
perception that marriage is a contract between equals that can be terminated at will by one 
spouse has become increasingly common (Glendon, 1987; White, 1990). 
Again, to demonstrate the complexity of the relation between cultural values and legal change, 
legal changes do not always have a dramatic effect on cultural values and practice. For example, 
despite the legal changes that have supported and even encouraged various forms of joint 
custody following divorce, the vast majority. of couples in all of the countries surveyed in this 
article continue to choose to empower the mother with sole custody (Cretney & Masson, 1990; 
Glendon, 1989; Maccoby et al, 1993). 
CONCLUSIONS 
We undertook this review of changes in divorce laws not only to provide information about the 
laws of several Western countries, but also to highlight the complex relation between cultural 
values and the legal aspects of divorce. To further our understanding of this complex relation, we 
recommend that future researchers incorporate non-Western countries into their analyses. At the 
same time, we recognize that language barriers and the lack of information about these countries 
make this a formidable task. 
Although we have argued that research cannot provide unambiguous, objective answers to 
questions related to the effects of changing divorce laws, we do not wish to discourage 
researchers from examining these important issues. Rather, we recommend that researchers and 
those who review their work make a concerted effort to become conscious of their value stances 
on the dimensions outlined earlier in this article, to assess how these value positions are 
influencing their inferences about the effects of changes in divorce laws, and to explicitly state 
their values when they communicate about these issues. If these recommendations are followed, 
the dialogues among researchers, policy planners, and the general public may become more open 
and informative, international analyses of divorce laws may become even more useful than they 
presently are, and more effective divorce legislation can be implemented. 
NOTE 
The authors express their appreciation to three anonymous reviewers who provided helpful 
comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Please address correspondence to Mark A. Fine. 
REFERENCES 
Anderson, M., Churchill, R. R., & Hampton, C. (1973). Sweden: family law. International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, 22; 173-190. 
Archbishop's Group. (1966). Putting asunder: A divorce law for contemporary society: The 
report of a group appointed by the Archbishop of Canterbury. London: Society for the 
Propagation of Christian Knowledge. 
Bainham, A. (1990). The privatisation of the public interest in children. The Modern Law 
Review, 53, 206246. 
Balakrishnan, T. R., Rao, K. V., Lapierre-Adamcyk, E., & Krotki, K. (1987). A hazard model 
analysis of the covariates of marriage dissolution in Canada. Demography, 24, 395-406. 
Belsky, J., & Eggebeen, D. (1991). Scientific criticism and the study of early and extensive 
maternal employment. Journal of Marriage and the Family, 53, 1107-1110. 
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971). 
Bohndorf, M., Borensztajn, J., Crosbie, J., Hampton, C., March Hunnings, N., & Wadsley, P. 
(1970). Current legal developments--Sweden. International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 19, 
156-167. 
Braver, S. L., Wolchik, S. A., Sandlcr, I. N., Sheets, V. L., Fogas, B., & Bay, R. C. (1993). A 
longitudinal study of noncustodial parents: Parents without children. Journal of Family 
Psychology, 7, 9-23. 
Buehier, C. (in press). Divorce law in the United States. Marriage and Family Review. 
California Civil Code S4506. (1983). St. Paul, MN: West. 
Chambers, D. (1984); Rethinking the substantive rules for custody disputes in divorce. 
University of Michigan Law Review, 83, 527-538. 
Chambers, D. (1985). The "legalization" of the family: Toward a policy of supportive neutrality. 
University of Michigan Journal of Legal Reform. 18, 805-827. 
Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, Pub.L. No. 98-378, 98 Stat. 1305 (1984). 
Civil Code, articles 229-259-3 and 270, as amended by Law No. 75-617 (1975,France). 
Cretney, S., & Masson, J. M. (1990). Principles of family law (5th ed.). London: Sweet & 
Maxwell. 
Dillon, M. (1993). Debating divorce: Moral conflict in Ireland. Lexington: The University Press 
of Kentucky. 
Divorce Reform Law. (1966). In Laws of New York (Ch. 254). 
Duquette, D. N. (1992). Symposium: Child protection legal process: Comparing the United 
States and Great Britain. University of Pittsburgh Law Review, 54, 239-294. 
Eekelaar, J. (1991). [Review of Abortion and divorce in Western law by M. A. Glendon]. Journal 
of Family Law, 29, 551-554. 
Eekelaar, J., & Maclean, M. (1986). Maintenance after divorce. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Elliot, D. (1991). Substitute family care for children in Britain: Social Service Review, 65, 564-
581. 
Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 103f, 102 Star. 2346 (1989) (codified at 42 
U.S.C. section 667(b)(2) 1989) 
Fine, M. A., Schwebel, A. I., & Myers, L. J. (1987). Family stability in black families: Values 
underlying three different perspectives. Journal of Comparative Family Studies, 18, 1-23. 
Fineman, M. A. (1991). The illusion of equality: The rhetoric and reality of divorce reform. 
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
Fineman, M. L., & Opie, A. (1987). The uses of social seience data in legal policymaking: 
Custody determinations at divorce. Wisconsin Law Review, 1, 107158. 
Freeman, M.D. A. (1991a). England: Rethinking family rights and responsibilities. Journal of 
Family Law, 30, 295-317. 
Freeman, M.D. A. (1991b). England's new children's charter. Journal of Family Law, 29, 343-
357. 
Freeman, M.D. A. (1992). England: The child's welfare and parental rights. University of 
Louisville Journal of Family Law, 31,319-345. 
Garfinkel, I., & Melli, M. S. (1990). The use of normative standards in family law decisions: 
Developing mathematical standards for child support. Family Law Quarterly, 24, 157-178. 
Garrison, M. (1990). The economics of divorce: Changing rules, changing results. In S. D. 
Sugarman & H. H. Kay (Eds.), Divorce reform at the crossroads (pp. 75-101). New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press. 
Glendon, M. A. (1987). Abortion and divorce in Western law. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press. 
Glendon, M. A. (1989). The transformation of family law: State, law, and family in the United 
States and Western Europe. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
Goldstein, J., Freud, A, & Solnit, A. J. (1979). Beyond the best interests of the child. New York: 
Free Press. 
Grossen, J. (1986). Comparative developments in the law of matrimonial regimes. Tulane Law 
Review, 60, 1199-1208. 
Hetherington, E. M., Cox, M., & Cox, R. (1978). The aftermath of divorce. In J. H. Stevens, Jr. 
& M. Matthews (Eds.), Mother-child, father-child relations (pp. 110-155). Washington, DC: 
National As -sociation for the Education of Young Children. 
Ietswaart, H. F. P. (1989). Incomplete stories. Boston University Law Review, 69, 257-271. 
Jacob, H. (1988). Silent revolution: The transformation of divorce law in the United States. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Johnson, J. R. (1993,December 16). Personal communication. 
Johnston, J. R., Kline, M., & Tschann, J. M. (1989). Ongoing postdivorce conflict: Effects on 
children of joint custody and frequent access. American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 59, 576-592 
Kline, M., Tschann, J. M., Johnston, J. R., & Wallerstein, J. S. (1989). Children's adjustment in 
joint and sole physical custody families. Developmental Psychology, 25, 430-438. Krause, H. D. 
(1977). Family law. St. Paul: West. 
Law Commission. (1966). Reform of the grounds of divorce: The field of choice. London: Her 
Majesty's Stationery Office. 
Maccoby, E. E., Buchanan, C. M, Mnookin, R. H, & Dornbusch, S. M. (1993). Postdivorce roles 
of mothers and fathers in the lives of their children. Journal of Family Psychology, 7, 24-38. 
Marriage Code of 11 June, 1920 SS 1-5, as amended 1973 (1973,Sweden). 
Melli, M. S. (1992). The United States: Continuuing concern with the economic consequences of 
divorce. University of Louisville Journal of Family Law, 31, 491-500. 
Miller, B.C. (1992). Families, science, and values: Alternative views of parenting effects and 
adolescent pregnancy. Journal of Marriage and the Family, 55, 7-21. 
O'Donnell, H. B., IV. (1990). Title I of the Family Support Act of 1988: The quest for effective 
national child support enforcement continues. Journal of Family Law, 29, 149-169. 
Oldham, J. (1992). Putting asunder in the 1990s: Divorce reform at the crossroads. California 
Law Review. 80, 1091-1131. 
Oster, S. M. (1987). A note on the determination of alimony. Journal of Marriage and the 
Family, 49, 8186. 
Phillips, R. (1988). Putting asunder: A history of divorce in Western society. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Resnik, J. (1991). "Naturally" without gender: Women, jurisdiction, and the federal courts. New 
York University Law Review, 66, 1682-1746. 
Rettig, K. D., Christensen, D. H., & Dahl, C. M. (1991). Impact of child support guidelines on 
the economic well-being of children. Family Relations, 40, 167175. 
Rheinstein, M. (1971). Marriage stability, divorce, and the law. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Roman, M., & Haddad, W. (1978). The disposable parent: The case for joint custody. New York: 
Holt, Rinehart, & Winston. 
Rubellin-Devichi, J. (1990). France: The new principles of family law--Liberty, equality, and 
fraternity. Journal of Family Law, 28, 491-494. 
Saldeen, A. (1991). Sweden: Property, maintenance and state support. Journal of Family Law, 
30, 409-415. 
Saldeen, A. (1992). Sweden: Rights of the unborn child and a children's ombudsman. University 
of Louisville Journal of Family Law, 30, 477-481. 
Scott, E. (1990). Rational decision making about marriage and divorce. Virginia Law Review, 
76, 9-94. 
Seltzer, J. A, & Garfinkel, I. (1990). Inequality in divorce settlements: An investigation of 
property settlements and child support awards. Social Science Research, 19, 82-111. 
Simon, S. (1991,July 15). Joint custody loses favor for increasing children's feeling of being torn 
apart. Wall Street Journal, pp. B1, B2. 
Stetson, D. M. (1982). A woman's issue: The politics of family law reform in England. Westport, 
CT: Greenwood Press. 
Stoljar, S. (1989). A history of the French law of divorce--I. International Journal of Law and the 
Family, 3, 137-159. 
Stone, L. (1990). The road to divorce: England 15301987. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Sundberg, J. (1975). Recent changes in Swedish family law: Experiment repeated. American 
Journal of Comparative Law, 23, 34-46. 
Walker, T. B, & Elrod, L. D. (1993). Family law in the fifty states: An overview. Family Law 
Quarterly, 26, 319-421. 
Wallerstein, J. S., & Kelly, J. B. (1980). Surviving the breakup: How children and parents cope 
with divorce. New York: Basic Books. 
Weitzman, L. J. (1985). The divorce revolution: The unexpected social and economic 
consequences for women and children in America. New York: Free Press. 
White, L. K. (1990). Determinants of divorce: A review of research in the eighties. Journal of 
Marriage and the Family. 52, 904-912. 
